David Frum mentions, in his interesting conservative take-down of Rush Limbaugh, that Republicans dominated the college-educated vote in every presidential election since the inception of exit polling, until 2008, when Obama beat McCain by 8 points among B.A holders.
Reagan also dominated the youth vote, though the pendulum has since swung heavily the other way.
The Republican party's recent attempts to find its own Obama resulted in the unfortunate televised State of the Union response by Bobby Jindal, and RNC chair Michael Steele's awkward and widely mocked attempts to connect to "hip-hop" voters.
In the meantime, Limbaugh has been there to shout as the party floundered for real leadership. The GOP could certainly do with more Frum and less Limbaugh right now.
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Madoff and the SEC
Slate's "Big Money" says Madoff's fraud exposes how bad the SEC was at doing its job. I don't know that this is true.
Sure, the SEC ignored the detailed memo submitted by dogged whistleblower Harry Markopolos, but all those submissions were anonymously submitted, because Markopolos feared retribution by Madoff. Government agencies get a lot of mail from cranks, and it doesn't seem efficient or desirable in a free society to launch federal investigations on the strength of anonymous accusations.
We can regret, in hindsight, that the SEC didn't catch Madoff sooner, but the fact that the SEC didn't launch an investigation over the anonymous Markopolos memo isn't a basis for criticizing the agency; if anonymous tips start bringing down government heat, we'll replace the possibility of an undetected fraud with the certainty of malicious and false anonymous tips damaging honest business.
And it would be unfortunate to tolerate such excess, because we don't need more oversight from the SEC to protect against people like Madoff. He operated with limited oversight because his clientele was rich and sophisticated, and should have been able to watch out for their own interests.
There are a whole lot of specialized entities that only manage money for wealthy and institutional investors, precisely because the SEC allows such funds to operate with little regulatory oversight on the premise that these investors can protect themselves from fraud.
Funds that are managing the savings of ordinary workers and families face much more stringent regulatory scrutiny because these investors are thought to be more vulnerable to fraud and less capable of understanding where their money is going.
But the fact that some sophisticated investors failed to protect themselves doesn't disprove the presumption that they were capable of doing so. Any of the fund managers who were directing capital to Madoff could have done the same analysis Markopolos did.
Increased SEC examination of lightly-regulated funds will consume public resources while destroying the abilities of these funds to develop proprietary investment strategies.
The funds chose to be hedge funds in the first place because they saw more upside to lighter regulatory involvement, even at the cost of closing off sources of capital who the regulators offer higher protections. The sophisticated investors chose to invest with the hedge funds, anticipating higher returns, even though they knew other types of funds offered more regulatory protection for investors.
After 9/11, the government created its new TSA agency to manage airport security. Now, before travelers get on an airplane, they must throw away their toothpaste, strip off their shoes and belts, and often submit to pat-downs. For this embarrassment and inconvenience, travelers get almost zero marginal safety benefit.
Putting similar inconvenient restrictions on investment would probably offer a similarly marginal benefit at the much higher cost of delaying recovery, especially since the Treasury is relying on hedge funds to buy toxic securities as part of its bank rescue.
The lesson of Madoff is greater skepticism of too-good-to-be-true returns and more diligence by investors. It may be appealing to call for a regulatory environment where this sort of thing cannot happen, but the cure would be worse than the disease.
Sure, the SEC ignored the detailed memo submitted by dogged whistleblower Harry Markopolos, but all those submissions were anonymously submitted, because Markopolos feared retribution by Madoff. Government agencies get a lot of mail from cranks, and it doesn't seem efficient or desirable in a free society to launch federal investigations on the strength of anonymous accusations.
We can regret, in hindsight, that the SEC didn't catch Madoff sooner, but the fact that the SEC didn't launch an investigation over the anonymous Markopolos memo isn't a basis for criticizing the agency; if anonymous tips start bringing down government heat, we'll replace the possibility of an undetected fraud with the certainty of malicious and false anonymous tips damaging honest business.
And it would be unfortunate to tolerate such excess, because we don't need more oversight from the SEC to protect against people like Madoff. He operated with limited oversight because his clientele was rich and sophisticated, and should have been able to watch out for their own interests.
There are a whole lot of specialized entities that only manage money for wealthy and institutional investors, precisely because the SEC allows such funds to operate with little regulatory oversight on the premise that these investors can protect themselves from fraud.
Funds that are managing the savings of ordinary workers and families face much more stringent regulatory scrutiny because these investors are thought to be more vulnerable to fraud and less capable of understanding where their money is going.
But the fact that some sophisticated investors failed to protect themselves doesn't disprove the presumption that they were capable of doing so. Any of the fund managers who were directing capital to Madoff could have done the same analysis Markopolos did.
Increased SEC examination of lightly-regulated funds will consume public resources while destroying the abilities of these funds to develop proprietary investment strategies.
The funds chose to be hedge funds in the first place because they saw more upside to lighter regulatory involvement, even at the cost of closing off sources of capital who the regulators offer higher protections. The sophisticated investors chose to invest with the hedge funds, anticipating higher returns, even though they knew other types of funds offered more regulatory protection for investors.
After 9/11, the government created its new TSA agency to manage airport security. Now, before travelers get on an airplane, they must throw away their toothpaste, strip off their shoes and belts, and often submit to pat-downs. For this embarrassment and inconvenience, travelers get almost zero marginal safety benefit.
Putting similar inconvenient restrictions on investment would probably offer a similarly marginal benefit at the much higher cost of delaying recovery, especially since the Treasury is relying on hedge funds to buy toxic securities as part of its bank rescue.
The lesson of Madoff is greater skepticism of too-good-to-be-true returns and more diligence by investors. It may be appealing to call for a regulatory environment where this sort of thing cannot happen, but the cure would be worse than the disease.
Monday, March 9, 2009
Stem Cell Research
Congratulations to President Obama for reversing George W. Bush's absurd restrictions on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research.
William Saletan at Slate is concerned we're going to lose our souls over this stuff. He shouldn't worry too much; there's no serious moral problem with this research, because a complete genetic code is a necessary but not sufficient component of humanity. That means that embryos are not people. They're not proto people. They're human genetic material, but they are not human beings.
An embryo lacks agency. It lacks self awareness. It lacks the capacity to experience pain. Insects are more capable of suffering than a human embryo. Moreover, these embryos, leftovers from in vitro fertilization, lack the necessary circumstances to ever become human.
An embryo outside a womb contains a recipe for humanity, but, in the same way that semen expelled in a condition where procreation is impossible, or an ovum expelled from the uterus through menstruation, it this genetic material does not exist in a context where it can become a person.
Even if the embryo were inserted into a hospitable uterus, it is more likely to die than to develop. The embryos that may be used for stem cell research would never have become people.
While there is room for argument over the point in development in which a fetus becomes an entity with moral significance, it's unreasonable to place that point at the moment the sperm and the egg fuse, especially where that occurs outside the human body.
The exaltation of morally insignificant genetic material is a rhetorical position that allows people of certain ideological persuasions to oppose recreational sex, contraception, fertility treatment and abortion.
These 'pro-life' individuals are perfectly willing to forego cures for terrible and deadly diseases to avoid making a rhetorical compromise. If anyone is missing a soul, it's them.
If my soul is in danger, it's because I've eaten the flesh of animals raised in hellish conditions and slaughtered for my consumption. It's because I've purchased products manufactured in foreign factories where wages and conditions are dismal. It's because I've gone about my business while the horrific genocide in the Sudan has raged unchecked.
All this stuff is worth losing sleep over. Tiny bundles of cells in petri dishes are of absolutely no moral concern.
William Saletan at Slate is concerned we're going to lose our souls over this stuff. He shouldn't worry too much; there's no serious moral problem with this research, because a complete genetic code is a necessary but not sufficient component of humanity. That means that embryos are not people. They're not proto people. They're human genetic material, but they are not human beings.
An embryo lacks agency. It lacks self awareness. It lacks the capacity to experience pain. Insects are more capable of suffering than a human embryo. Moreover, these embryos, leftovers from in vitro fertilization, lack the necessary circumstances to ever become human.
An embryo outside a womb contains a recipe for humanity, but, in the same way that semen expelled in a condition where procreation is impossible, or an ovum expelled from the uterus through menstruation, it this genetic material does not exist in a context where it can become a person.
Even if the embryo were inserted into a hospitable uterus, it is more likely to die than to develop. The embryos that may be used for stem cell research would never have become people.
While there is room for argument over the point in development in which a fetus becomes an entity with moral significance, it's unreasonable to place that point at the moment the sperm and the egg fuse, especially where that occurs outside the human body.
The exaltation of morally insignificant genetic material is a rhetorical position that allows people of certain ideological persuasions to oppose recreational sex, contraception, fertility treatment and abortion.
These 'pro-life' individuals are perfectly willing to forego cures for terrible and deadly diseases to avoid making a rhetorical compromise. If anyone is missing a soul, it's them.
If my soul is in danger, it's because I've eaten the flesh of animals raised in hellish conditions and slaughtered for my consumption. It's because I've purchased products manufactured in foreign factories where wages and conditions are dismal. It's because I've gone about my business while the horrific genocide in the Sudan has raged unchecked.
All this stuff is worth losing sleep over. Tiny bundles of cells in petri dishes are of absolutely no moral concern.
Predicting the "Watchmen" box office
Slate.com's "Big Money" blog is predicting a $169 million total box office take for "Watchmen" based on the opening weekend gross and the Metacritic score.
I think their total might turn out a little low. Their calculation neglects to consider several major factors: the film's running time, the film's R rating, and the month of release.
Most of the films compared on Slate's chart were June/July releases, which tend to be very front-loaded because, during the summer's movie glut, the blockbusters come in rapid succession, often with only a week to make a mark. Theater booking and marketing is designed to really front-load those releases.
The film's three-hour running time also reduces the number of showings per screen, so there were less screenings of "Watchmen" per screen than there might have been for a shorter movie. That means there are likely to be viewers turned away from sold out shows, who will come back next weekend.
The film's R rating and its source material in a 1980's era comic book may also skew the audience older. Adult viewers are relatively less likely to pack a theater on the release weekend.
On the other hand, "300," a 2006 R-rated March release from the same director, also with mediocre reviews, roughly tripled its opening weekend take, so there may be something to Slate's model.
I think their total might turn out a little low. Their calculation neglects to consider several major factors: the film's running time, the film's R rating, and the month of release.
Most of the films compared on Slate's chart were June/July releases, which tend to be very front-loaded because, during the summer's movie glut, the blockbusters come in rapid succession, often with only a week to make a mark. Theater booking and marketing is designed to really front-load those releases.
The film's three-hour running time also reduces the number of showings per screen, so there were less screenings of "Watchmen" per screen than there might have been for a shorter movie. That means there are likely to be viewers turned away from sold out shows, who will come back next weekend.
The film's R rating and its source material in a 1980's era comic book may also skew the audience older. Adult viewers are relatively less likely to pack a theater on the release weekend.
On the other hand, "300," a 2006 R-rated March release from the same director, also with mediocre reviews, roughly tripled its opening weekend take, so there may be something to Slate's model.
Neoliberalism
Fish at the NYT is upset today because he is accused of "Neoliberalism." He characterizes this as an ideology that solves everything with markets, and he points to Ronald Coase as one of its proponents.
Fish seems to want to separate ethics from efficiencies, and that makes no sense. Destroying economic value makes society poorer, and a series of destructive economic decisions collectively make society materially worse-off, increasing misery, poverty and want.
A few Marxists may continue to hold that a relatively wealthier society with high inequality is ethically preferable to a relatively poorer society with less inequality, but otherwise, most ethical frameworks do, in fact, try to preserve things that are of value, rather than destroying them.
A number of philosophers define ethical goods in terms of utility. Neoliberals don't oppose state intervention in markets; they oppose the destruction of value and inefficient mechanisms that prevent utility-maximizing outcomes.
The state is implicitly involved, for example, in the Coase hypothetical involving the factory and the stream, because there has to be a rights framework to determine how the burden will be distributed.
The dispute between the fisherman and the factory is a very direct example of a market failure requiring a legal correction. If there is no state mechanism to protect the fisherman's rights, the factory owner will pollute without regard to the damage to the fish, and the fisherman will bear the cost.
This is an economic externality, where part of the cost of economic behavior is borne by someone who is not a participant. The market will not account for this external cost, and the state must step in to correct the externality.
The notion that efficiency generates the best possible outcome merely instructs the state in how to solve the problem; i.e. by awarding damages to the fisherman, or facilitating a settlement between the factory and the fisherman, instead of allowing the fisherman's livelihood to be destroyed without affording him compensation, or shuttering the factory to preserve the stream.
I assume Fish is being accused of neoliberalism because his previous columns have suggested that academic tenure creates value-destroying situations. This characterization is incorrect; Fish seems to argue against expansive academic freedom and tenure protections as a moral bad. The neoliberal would disagree with Fish, arguing that tenure, which is an agreement mutually reached between universities and professors, is a value-maximizing arrangement in which the benefits of giving the professors broad discretion in their activities and near-immunity from termination exceed the costs.
Fish seems to want to separate ethics from efficiencies, and that makes no sense. Destroying economic value makes society poorer, and a series of destructive economic decisions collectively make society materially worse-off, increasing misery, poverty and want.
A few Marxists may continue to hold that a relatively wealthier society with high inequality is ethically preferable to a relatively poorer society with less inequality, but otherwise, most ethical frameworks do, in fact, try to preserve things that are of value, rather than destroying them.
A number of philosophers define ethical goods in terms of utility. Neoliberals don't oppose state intervention in markets; they oppose the destruction of value and inefficient mechanisms that prevent utility-maximizing outcomes.
The state is implicitly involved, for example, in the Coase hypothetical involving the factory and the stream, because there has to be a rights framework to determine how the burden will be distributed.
The dispute between the fisherman and the factory is a very direct example of a market failure requiring a legal correction. If there is no state mechanism to protect the fisherman's rights, the factory owner will pollute without regard to the damage to the fish, and the fisherman will bear the cost.
This is an economic externality, where part of the cost of economic behavior is borne by someone who is not a participant. The market will not account for this external cost, and the state must step in to correct the externality.
The notion that efficiency generates the best possible outcome merely instructs the state in how to solve the problem; i.e. by awarding damages to the fisherman, or facilitating a settlement between the factory and the fisherman, instead of allowing the fisherman's livelihood to be destroyed without affording him compensation, or shuttering the factory to preserve the stream.
I assume Fish is being accused of neoliberalism because his previous columns have suggested that academic tenure creates value-destroying situations. This characterization is incorrect; Fish seems to argue against expansive academic freedom and tenure protections as a moral bad. The neoliberal would disagree with Fish, arguing that tenure, which is an agreement mutually reached between universities and professors, is a value-maximizing arrangement in which the benefits of giving the professors broad discretion in their activities and near-immunity from termination exceed the costs.
Monday, February 16, 2009
Academic Freedom
Stanley Fish at the New York Times is arguing that university professors ought to be subjected to more stringent performance requirements, and should not be protected for reasons of academic freedom. He supports this contention by discussing the misbehavior of an a Canadian professor named Denis Rancourt.
Fish's column this week argues that there is no right to academic freedom that justifies such protections, and he cites court cases where judges have refused to find that there is a testimonial privilege for academics (similar to the privilege protecting attorney-client confidentiality, or the marital privilege). But professors like Rancourt are difficult to terminate because universities enter complicated employment agreements with academics that protect their positions.
Fish points out that there is no constitutional protection for academic behavior, and argues that professors ought not to have autonomy from the 'goals of the enterprise.'
But the degree of control a school has over its faculty is precisely the question that is answered by the existence of tenure.
Fish is right that tenure isn’t a constitutional right. But those professional norms are formalized in contractual agreements, and institutions enter those binding agreements voluntarily, at their discretion. Tenure is a special kind of employee benefit. Rancourt is difficult to dislodge from his position not because he has some kind of special Constitutional protection, but because the university has entered into a contract with him that makes him extremely difficult to fire.
Whether the needs of academic freedom require contractual protections so powerful that they make it impossible to dislodge a faculty member who goes insane is an interesting question, but even if they regret the terms of their agreement with Rancourt, they are bound nonetheless.
Universities are sophisticated negotiators, and their tenure review process provides for intense scrutiny of candidates for tenured positions. There’s no reason why their promises ought to be less binding than anyone else’s.
The tenured professor, similarly, is not beholden to the ‘goals of the enterprise,’ because he has not agreed to be. If that was what universities wanted from professors, they would negotiate different terms into their employment agreements.
The agreements presuppose that the ‘goals of the enterprise’ are suspect, and can be influenced in questionable ways by politically powerful actors. Professors accordingly negotiate for substantial autonomy and job security, and universities agree to grant it. They provide the secretary and the office space and the salary and the tenure protections as consideration in exchange for the professor’s affiliation with the university.
And there certainly is a place for academic freedom; for example, if a donor or a coalition of donors wanted to force a school’s biology department to provide equal time to creationism, tenure would protect biology professors who refused to teach junk science.
Fish's column this week argues that there is no right to academic freedom that justifies such protections, and he cites court cases where judges have refused to find that there is a testimonial privilege for academics (similar to the privilege protecting attorney-client confidentiality, or the marital privilege). But professors like Rancourt are difficult to terminate because universities enter complicated employment agreements with academics that protect their positions.
Fish points out that there is no constitutional protection for academic behavior, and argues that professors ought not to have autonomy from the 'goals of the enterprise.'
But the degree of control a school has over its faculty is precisely the question that is answered by the existence of tenure.
Fish is right that tenure isn’t a constitutional right. But those professional norms are formalized in contractual agreements, and institutions enter those binding agreements voluntarily, at their discretion. Tenure is a special kind of employee benefit. Rancourt is difficult to dislodge from his position not because he has some kind of special Constitutional protection, but because the university has entered into a contract with him that makes him extremely difficult to fire.
Whether the needs of academic freedom require contractual protections so powerful that they make it impossible to dislodge a faculty member who goes insane is an interesting question, but even if they regret the terms of their agreement with Rancourt, they are bound nonetheless.
Universities are sophisticated negotiators, and their tenure review process provides for intense scrutiny of candidates for tenured positions. There’s no reason why their promises ought to be less binding than anyone else’s.
The tenured professor, similarly, is not beholden to the ‘goals of the enterprise,’ because he has not agreed to be. If that was what universities wanted from professors, they would negotiate different terms into their employment agreements.
The agreements presuppose that the ‘goals of the enterprise’ are suspect, and can be influenced in questionable ways by politically powerful actors. Professors accordingly negotiate for substantial autonomy and job security, and universities agree to grant it. They provide the secretary and the office space and the salary and the tenure protections as consideration in exchange for the professor’s affiliation with the university.
And there certainly is a place for academic freedom; for example, if a donor or a coalition of donors wanted to force a school’s biology department to provide equal time to creationism, tenure would protect biology professors who refused to teach junk science.
Monday, February 2, 2009
Philip K. Howard is wrong. Everybody needs lawyers.
Dahlia Lithwick at Slate has a review of a book called Life without Lawyers." The book seems to combine complaining about tort suits with advocating deregulation. Lithwick's review digresses into off-point complaining about the Bush administration's treatment of terror detainees.
Here's what I think about this guy's argument:
1) Frivolous lawsuits are very unusual
Frivolous lawsuits are terrific anecdotes for people who are intentionally trying to mislead. In fact, frivolous lawsuits are only borderline relevant to the issues surrounding personal injury torts, because they are infrequent and easily disposed of.
Lawyers who represent injured plaintiffs are paid contingent fees, which means that the lawyer doesn't get paid unless the client recovers money. This means that injury lawyers have a tremendous disincentive to represent clients in frivolous actions; when the case inevitably reaches an unfavorable resolution, the lawyer's work and expenses poured into it will be uncompensated. And in case that isn't disincentive enough, there are various sanctions that can be imposed on frivolous plaintiffs and their attorneys.
The legal system creates plenty of bizarre anecdotes, like the one about the man who sued his dry cleaner for $50 million over lost pants. The cases are generally disposed of quickly, and comprise a miniscule percentage of total tort litigation. Some unscrupulous advocates for reform try to cherry-pick a handful of the most egregious crazy lawsuits to make a point that society is overly litigious or that the legal system is sick in some way.
To assume, based on the existence of this single lawsuit, that courts are clogged with similar disputes is fallacious for the same reason it is incorrect to assume that shopping malls are full of naked dope fiends because a junkie took a nude walk in a mall once.
2) "Less law" or "less lawyers" won't really help
Howard quotes a bunch of random statistics; for example, the fact that Congress passed 70,000 pages of legislation. It appears he is insinuating that the volume of legislation has some sort of causal connection with the increase in tort litigation that Howard contends is occurring. He is lying.
Injury lawsuits and the volume of federal legislation have absolutely no relation to each other. There is a lot more to legislation than injury suits; those 70,000 pages are mostly about how to spend Federal money. Almost none of it is related to tort suit, and Congress certainly isn't rolling out lots of new torts to sue for.
Virtually all personal injury torts are based in state tort law; to imply to lay readers that Congress is spending its time inventing new ways to sue for frivolous personal injuries is a kind of intellectual fraud.
What Howard actually seems to be doing is using unusual anecdotes about tort suits and weird nostalgia for dangerous playground equipment to make a completely obsolete argument for deregulation.
The people who rolled back the regulatory restrictions on Wall Street assumed that more money could be made without burdensome laws getting in the way, and where investors and money managers were allowed to innovate with minimal government intrusion, accountability would take over. The opposite happened.
Hedge funds were allowed to run proprietary "black box" investment strategies because we assumed that the sophisticated (usually institutional) investors who were buying into them could conduct proper diligence and hold them accountable without needing the government looking over everyone's shoulder. That is how Madoff happened.
Deregulation advocates assumed that market incentives could steer participants into efficient decisions without government intervention. Instead, investors and managers took on too much leverage in pursuit of higher profits, and invested heavily and detrimentally in arcane and convoluted financial devices that nobody seems to have understood.
I'm sure Howard's book was written long before the collapse of Lehman, but, as it turns out, the roll-back of law doesn't result in a culture of accountability. It results in catastrophic failure and bailouts. Howard should be mildly embarrassed that his book contains a chapter titled "The Freedom to Take Risks."
Risk, we've learned, is not free. It will take a lot of pages of federal legislation and a lot of lawyers to untangle the mess lightly-regulated and ostensibly accountable people made.
Here's what I think about this guy's argument:
1) Frivolous lawsuits are very unusual
Frivolous lawsuits are terrific anecdotes for people who are intentionally trying to mislead. In fact, frivolous lawsuits are only borderline relevant to the issues surrounding personal injury torts, because they are infrequent and easily disposed of.
Lawyers who represent injured plaintiffs are paid contingent fees, which means that the lawyer doesn't get paid unless the client recovers money. This means that injury lawyers have a tremendous disincentive to represent clients in frivolous actions; when the case inevitably reaches an unfavorable resolution, the lawyer's work and expenses poured into it will be uncompensated. And in case that isn't disincentive enough, there are various sanctions that can be imposed on frivolous plaintiffs and their attorneys.
The legal system creates plenty of bizarre anecdotes, like the one about the man who sued his dry cleaner for $50 million over lost pants. The cases are generally disposed of quickly, and comprise a miniscule percentage of total tort litigation. Some unscrupulous advocates for reform try to cherry-pick a handful of the most egregious crazy lawsuits to make a point that society is overly litigious or that the legal system is sick in some way.
To assume, based on the existence of this single lawsuit, that courts are clogged with similar disputes is fallacious for the same reason it is incorrect to assume that shopping malls are full of naked dope fiends because a junkie took a nude walk in a mall once.
2) "Less law" or "less lawyers" won't really help
Howard quotes a bunch of random statistics; for example, the fact that Congress passed 70,000 pages of legislation. It appears he is insinuating that the volume of legislation has some sort of causal connection with the increase in tort litigation that Howard contends is occurring. He is lying.
Injury lawsuits and the volume of federal legislation have absolutely no relation to each other. There is a lot more to legislation than injury suits; those 70,000 pages are mostly about how to spend Federal money. Almost none of it is related to tort suit, and Congress certainly isn't rolling out lots of new torts to sue for.
Virtually all personal injury torts are based in state tort law; to imply to lay readers that Congress is spending its time inventing new ways to sue for frivolous personal injuries is a kind of intellectual fraud.
What Howard actually seems to be doing is using unusual anecdotes about tort suits and weird nostalgia for dangerous playground equipment to make a completely obsolete argument for deregulation.
The people who rolled back the regulatory restrictions on Wall Street assumed that more money could be made without burdensome laws getting in the way, and where investors and money managers were allowed to innovate with minimal government intrusion, accountability would take over. The opposite happened.
Hedge funds were allowed to run proprietary "black box" investment strategies because we assumed that the sophisticated (usually institutional) investors who were buying into them could conduct proper diligence and hold them accountable without needing the government looking over everyone's shoulder. That is how Madoff happened.
Deregulation advocates assumed that market incentives could steer participants into efficient decisions without government intervention. Instead, investors and managers took on too much leverage in pursuit of higher profits, and invested heavily and detrimentally in arcane and convoluted financial devices that nobody seems to have understood.
I'm sure Howard's book was written long before the collapse of Lehman, but, as it turns out, the roll-back of law doesn't result in a culture of accountability. It results in catastrophic failure and bailouts. Howard should be mildly embarrassed that his book contains a chapter titled "The Freedom to Take Risks."
Risk, we've learned, is not free. It will take a lot of pages of federal legislation and a lot of lawyers to untangle the mess lightly-regulated and ostensibly accountable people made.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)